

AN ACCOUNT AT THE TURN OF THE YEAR 1942–1943^[1]

DB Works, Vol. 8

2009, Augsburg
Fortress

After Ten Years

Ten years is a long time in the life of every human being. Because time is the most precious gift at our disposal, being of all gifts the most ir retrievable, the thought of time possibly lost disturbs us whenever we look back. Time is lost when we have not lived, experienced things, learned, worked, enjoyed, and suffered as human beings. Lost time is unfulfilled, empty time. Certainly that is not what the past years have been. We have lost much, things far beyond measure, but time was not lost. Indeed, the insights and experiences we have gained and of which we have subsequently become aware are only abstractions from reality, from life itself. Yet just as the ability to forget is a gift of grace, so similarly is memory, the repetition of received teachings, part of responsible life. In the following pages I want to try to give an accounting of some of the shared experience and insight that have been forced upon us in these times, not personal experiences, nothing systematically organized, not arguments and theories, but conclusions about human experience—lined up side by side, connected only by concrete experience—that have been reached together in a circle of like-minded people. None of this is new; rather, it is something we have long been familiar with in times gone by, something given to us to experience and understand anew. One cannot write about these things without every word being

[1.] *NL*, A 65,9; typewritten copy made at the time; 14 pages (no paragraphing within individual passages; there are dashes between passages ["==="]); handwritten note by Eberhard Bethge: "Christmas 1942." This is a new translation; previous translation published in *LPP*, 3–17. Written for Eberhard Bethge, Hans von Dohnanyi, and Hans Oster.

accompanied by the feeling of gratitude for the community of spirit and of life that in all these years was preserved and shown to be worthwhile.

20

Without Ground under One's Feet

Have there ever been people in history who in their time, like us, had so little ground under their feet,^[2] people to whom every possible alternative open to them at the time appeared equally unbearable, senseless, and contrary to life? Have there been those who like us looked for the source of their strength beyond all those available alternatives? Were they looking entirely in what has passed away and in what is yet to come? And nevertheless, without being dreamers, did they await with calm and confidence the successful outcome of their endeavor? Or rather, facing a great historical turning point, and precisely because something genuinely new was coming to be that did not fit with the existing alternatives, did the responsible thinkers of another generation ever feel differently than we do today?

Who Stands Firm?

21

The huge masquerade of evil has thrown all ethical concepts into confusion. That evil should appear in the form of light, good deeds, historical necessity, social justice is absolutely bewildering for one coming from the world of ethical concepts that we have received. For the Christian who lives by the Bible, it is the very confirmation of the abysmal wickedness of evil.^[3] The failure of "*the reasonable ones*"—those who think, with the best of intentions and in their naive misreading of reality, that with a bit of reason

[2.] On the notion of "ground under one's feet," see the final paragraph of Bonhoeffer's sermon of May 8, 1932, on 2 Chron. 20:12 (*DBW* 11, 3/8); see also *DBWE* 7:67–69.

[3.] Cf. Bonhoeffer's comments on William Paton's 1941 book *The Church and the New Order* (written in Switzerland): "The deepest reason for the ethical confusion has . . . to do with the fact that the greatest injustice, as it is embodied in the National Socialist regime, was able to clothe itself in the garb of relative historical and social justice. . . . For those who do not see through the demonic nature of the evil manifesting itself in the form of justice, this becomes the poisonous source of all ethical disintegration. . . . Thus both from without and within, Hitler received moral support for his claim to be the God-given executor of historical justice, and only a small remnant was able to perceive, precisely here, Satan in the form of the angel of light" (*DBWE* 16, 2/11, pp. 530–31). Bonhoeffer referred to 2 Cor. 11:14 ("Even Satan disguises himself as an angel of light") in the 1932–33 winter seminar lectures on "Theological Anthropology" (*DBWE* 12, 2/2, p. 217) and in *DBWE* 3:106, as well as in 1936 (*DBW* 14:939–40). See in particular *DBWE* 6:77, ed.

they can patch up a structure that has come out of joint—is apparent. With their ability to see impaired, they want to do justice on every side, only to be crushed by the colliding forces without having accomplished anything at all. Disappointed that the world is so unreasonable, they see themselves condemned to unproductiveness; they withdraw in resignation or helplessly fall victim to the stronger.^[4]

More devastating is the failure of all ethical *fanaticism*. The fanatic believes that he can meet the power of evil with the purity of a principle.^[5] But like the bull in the arena, he attacks the red cape rather than the person carrying it, grows tired, and suffers defeat. He traps himself in the insignificant and ends up in the trap of the cleverer one.

The man of *conscience*^[6] has no one but himself when resisting the superior might of predicaments that demand a decision. But the dimensions of the conflict wherein he must make his choices are such that, counseled and supported by nothing but his very own conscience, he is torn apart. The innumerable respectable and seductive disguises by which evil approaches him make his conscience fearful and unsure until he finally settles for a salvaged conscience instead of a good conscience, that is, until he deceives his own conscience in order not to despair. That a bad conscience may be stronger and more wholesome than a deceived one is something that the man whose sole support is his conscience can never comprehend.

The reliable path of *duty* seems to offer the escape from the bewildering plethora of possible decisions. Here, that which has been commanded is clutched as the most certain; the responsibility for what has been commanded lies with the one giving the command rather than the one who

22

23

carries it out. However, duty is so circumscribed that there is never any room to venture that which rests wholly in one's own responsibility, the action that alone strikes at the very core of evil and can overcome it. The man of duty will in the end have to do his duty also to the devil.

There is the one who determines to take a stand in the world by acting on his own *freedom*. He values the necessary action more highly than an untarnished conscience and reputation. He is prepared to sacrifice a barren principle to a fruitful compromise or a barren wisdom of mediocrity to fruitful radicalism.^[7] Such a one needs to take care that his freedom does not cause him to stumble. He will condone the bad in order to prevent the worse and in so doing no longer discern that the very thing that he seeks to avoid as worse might well be better. This is where the basic material of tragedy is to be found.

In flight from public discussion and examination, this or that person may well attain the sanctuary of private *virtuousness*. But he must close his eyes and mouth to the injustice around him. He can remain undefiled by the consequences of responsible action only by deceiving himself. In everything he does, that which he fails to do will leave him no peace. He will either perish from that restlessness or turn into a hypocritical, self-righteous, small-minded human being.

Who stands firm?^[8] Only the one whose ultimate standard is not his reason, his principles, conscience, freedom, or virtue; only the one who is prepared to sacrifice all of these when, in faith and in relationship to God alone, he is called to obedient and responsible action.^[9] Such a person is the responsible one, whose life is to be nothing but a response to God's question and call. Where are these responsible ones?

Civil Courage

What really lies behind the lament about the lack of civil courage?^[10] In these years we have encountered much bravery and self-sacrifice but almost

note 7. The section "Who Stands Firm?" was written by Bonhoeffer in correspondence to the opening pages of the chapter "Ethics as Formation" in his 1940 *Ethics* (cf. *DBWE* 6:76–80). On the relation of these two texts, see H. E. Tödt, *Authentic Faith*, 209–17.

[4.] On the notepaper that Bonhoeffer had in his Tegel prison cell, the following statement is written: "Contempt for the world turns into bondage of the world; on the basis of contempt for the world one renounces changing the world and thus sustains it as it is" (*NL*, A 86,18).

[5.] On the critique of an ethics of principle, see *DBWE* 10, 2/1, pp. 336–67, et passim, as well as *DBWE* 6:81–82: "Wise people know the limited receptivity of reality for principles, because they know that reality is not built on principles, but rests on the living creating God. So they also know that reality can be helped neither by the purest principles nor with the best will, but only by the living God. Principles are only tools in the hands of God; they will soon be thrown away when they are no longer useful." Regarding "principle(s)" in the sense of law, norm, ideal, abstraction, see, inter alia, Feil, *Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer*, 36–37.

[6.] [See H. E. Tödt, "Conflicts of Conscience," 169–78.—]DC]

[7.] On "compromise" and "radicalism," see *DBWE* 6:153–59.

[8.] On "standing firm" or "resisting," see Pieper, *Vom Sinn der Tapferkeit*, 24, 56.

[9.] See Luther's "Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians" (1531; *LW* 26:387): "And this is why our theology is certain: it snatches us away from ourselves and places us outside ourselves so that we do not depend on our own strength, conscience, experience or works, but depend on that which is outside ourselves, that is, on the promise and truth of God, which cannot deceive."

[10.] See *DBWE* 10, 1/181, pp. 305–6.

no civil courage anywhere, even among ourselves. Only an altogether naive psychology would trace this deficiency back simply to personal cowardice. The reasons behind this are quite different. In the course of a long history, we Germans have had to learn the need for obedience and the power thereof. We saw the meaning and greatness of our life in the subordination of all personal wishes and ideas under the commission that came to be ours. Our gaze was directed upward, not in slavish fear but in the free trust that beheld a career in the commission and a vocation in the career.^[11] The readiness to follow an order from "above" rather than one's own discretion arises from and is part of the justified suspicion about one's own heart. Who would contest that, in relation to obedience, commission, and career, the German has again and again accomplished the utmost in bravery and life commitment. But he safeguarded his freedom—where in the world was freedom spoken of more passionately than in Germany, from Luther to the philosophy of idealism?—by seeking to free himself from self-will in order to serve the whole: career and freedom were to him two sides of the same thing. However, in doing so he misjudged the world; he did not reckon with the fact that the readiness to subordinate and commit his life to the commission could be misused in the service of evil. When such misuse occurred, the exercise of the career itself became questionable, and all the basic moral [sittlichen] concepts of the Germans were shaken. What became apparent was that Germans lacked still one decisive and fundamental idea: that of the need for the free, responsible action even against career and commission. In its place came the irresponsible lack of scruples, on the one hand, and self-tormenting scruples that never led to action, on the other. But civil courage can grow only from the free responsibility of the free man. Only today are Germans beginning to discover what free responsibility means. It is founded in a God who calls for the free venture of faith to responsible action and who promises forgiveness and consolation to the one who on account of such action becomes a sinner.

On Success

Even though it is indeed not true that success also justifies the evil deed and the reprehensible means,^[12] it is similarly out of the question to regard

[11.] See also *DBWE* 6:288–95.

[12.] An allusion to the saying: "Cum finis est licitus, etiam media sunt licita" (If the end is acceptable, so too are the means thereto). On this, see Schilling, *Lehrbuch der Moralthologie*, 1:209–11.

success as something that is ethically wholly neutral.^[13] It so happens that historical success creates the ground on which alone life can go on. The question remains as to whether it is ethically more responsible to go to war like Don Quixote^[14] against a new age or, conceding one's defeat and freely consenting to it, finally to serve the new age. Success, after all, makes history, and the One who guides history always creates good from the bad over the head of the men who make history. It is a short circuit when the stickler for principle, thinking ahistorically and hence irresponsibly, simply ignores the ethical significance of success. It is good that for once we are forced to engage seriously the ethical problem of success. As long as the good is successful, we can afford the luxury of thinking of success as ethically irrelevant. But the problem arises once evil means bring about success. In the face of such a situation, we learn that neither the onlooker's theoretical critique and self-justification, that is, the refusal to enter into the arena of facts, nor opportunism, that is, disavowal and capitulation in the face of success, does justice to the task at hand. We may not and do not desire to act like offended critics or opportunists. Case by case and in each moment, as victors or vanquished, we desire to be those who are coresponsible for the shaping of history. The one who allows nothing that happens to deprive him of his coresponsibility for the course of history, knowing that it is God who placed it upon him, will find a fruitful relation to the events of history, beyond fruitless criticism and equally fruitless opportunism. Talk of going down heroically in the face of unavoidable defeat is basically quite nonheroic because it does not dare look into the future. The ultimately responsible question is not how I extricate myself heroically from a situation but [how]^[15] a coming generation is to go on living. Only from such a historically responsible question will fruitful solutions arise, however humiliating they may be for the moment. In short, it is much easier to see a situation through on the basis of principle than in concrete responsibility.

26 The younger generation will always have the surest sense whether an action is done merely in terms of principle or from living responsibly, for it is their future that is at stake.

[13.] On "success," see *DBWE* 6:50–53, 88–91, et passim.

[14.] On the figure of Don Quixote, see *DBWE* 10, 1/5, p. 63, and *DBWE* 6:51, 80–81. See also Süsselbeck, "Dietrich Bonhoeffer und Don Quijote."

[15.] The typewritten manuscript erroneously has "where."

On Stupidity

Stupidity^[16] is a more dangerous enemy of the good than malice. One may protest against evil; it can be exposed and, if need be, prevented by use of force. Evil always carries within itself the germ of its own subversion in that it leaves behind in human beings at least a sense of unease. Against stupidity we are defenseless. Neither protests nor the use of force accomplish anything here; reasons fall on deaf ears; facts that contradict one's prejudgment simply need not be believed—in such moments the stupid person even becomes critical—and when facts are irrefutable they are just pushed aside as inconsequential, as incidental. In all this the stupid person, in contrast to the malicious one, is utterly self-satisfied and, being easily irritated, becomes dangerous by going on the attack. For that reason, greater caution is called for when dealing with a stupid person than with a malicious one. Never again will we try to persuade the stupid person with reasons, for it is senseless and dangerous.

If we want to know how to get the better of stupidity, we must seek to understand its nature. This much is certain, that it is in essence not an intellectual^[17] defect but a human one. There are human beings who are of remarkably agile intellect yet stupid, and others who are intellectually quite dull yet anything but stupid. We discover this to our surprise in particular situations. The impression one gains is not so much that stupidity is a congenital defect but that, under certain circumstances, people are *made* stupid or that they allow this to happen to them.^[18] We note further that people who have isolated themselves from others or who live in solitude manifest this defect less frequently than individuals or groups of people inclined or condemned to sociability. And so it would seem that stupidity is perhaps less a psychological than a sociological problem. It is a particular form of the impact of historical circumstances on human beings, a psychological concomitant of certain external conditions. Upon closer observation, it becomes apparent that every strong upsurge of power in the public sphere, be it of a political or a religious nature, infects a large part of humankind with stupidity. It would even seem that this is virtually a sociological-psychological law. The power of the one needs the stupidity of

[16.] See *DBWE* 6:86–87.

[17.] See *DBW* 14:965: "But one cannot discuss with those who do not *want* to obey"; and 966, ed. note 68: "Every word of Scripture can be beaten to death by discussion. The error lies not in the intellect but in the willingness to obey."

[18.] Like the section on the "tyrannical despiser of human beings" in *Ethics* (*DBWE* 6:73, "He considers the people stupid and they become stupid"), the present section employs "stupidity" as a psychological characteristic of Hitler and his followers.

the other. The process at work here is not that particular human capacities, for instance, the intellect, suddenly atrophy or fail. Instead, it seems that under the overwhelming impact of rising power, humans are deprived of their inner independence and, more or less consciously, give up establishing an autonomous position toward the emerging circumstances. The fact that the stupid person is often stubborn must not blind us to the fact that he is not independent. In conversation with him, one virtually feels that one is dealing not at all with him as a person, but with slogans, catchwords, and the like that have taken possession of him. He is under a spell, blinded, misused, and abused in his very being. Having thus become a mindless tool, the stupid person will also be capable of any evil and at the same time incapable of seeing that it is evil. This is where the danger of diabolical misuse lurks, for it is this that can once and for all destroy human beings.

28 Yet at this very point it becomes quite clear that only an act of liberation, not instruction, can overcome stupidity. Here we must come to terms with the fact that in most cases a genuine internal liberation becomes possible only when external liberation has preceded it. Until then we must abandon all attempts to convince the stupid person. This state of affairs explains why in such circumstances our attempts to know what "the people" really think are in vain and why, under these circumstances, this question is so irrelevant for the person who is thinking and acting responsibly. The word of the Bible that the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom^[19] declares that the internal liberation of human beings to live the responsible life before God is the only genuine way to overcome stupidity.

But these thoughts about stupidity also offer consolation in that they utterly forbid us to consider the majority of people to be stupid in every circumstance. It really will depend on whether those in power expect more from peoples' stupidity than from their inner independence and wisdom.

Contempt for Humanity?

The danger of allowing ourselves to be driven to contempt for humanity^[20] is very real. We know very well that we have no right to let this happen and that it would lead us into the most unfruitful relation to human beings. The following thoughts may protect us against this temptation: through contempt for humanity we fall victim precisely to our opponents' chief errors. Whoever despises another human being will never be able to make

[19.] Prov. 1:7; Ps. 111:10.

[20.] See *DBWE* 6:85–88.

anything of him. Nothing of what we despise in another is itself foreign to us. How often do we expect more of the other than what we ourselves are willing to accomplish. Why is it that we have hitherto thought with so little sobriety about the temptability and frailty of human beings? We must learn to regard human beings less in terms of what they do and neglect to do and more in terms of what they suffer. The only fruitful relation to human beings—particularly to the weak among them—is love, that is, the will to enter into and to keep community with them. God did not hold human beings in contempt but became human for their sake.

Immanent Justice

It is one of the most astonishing experiences and also one of the most incontrovertible that evil—often in a surprisingly short span of time—proves itself to be stupid and impractical. That does not mean that punishment follows hard on the heels of each individual evil deed; what it does mean is that the suspension of God's commandments on principle in the supposed interest of earthly self-preservation acts precisely against what this self-preservation seeks to accomplish. One can interpret in various ways this experience that has fallen to us. In any case, one thing has emerged that seems certain: in the common life of human beings, there are laws that are stronger than everything that believes it can supersede them, and that it is therefore not only wrong but unwise to disregard these laws. This helps us understand why Aristotelian-Thomistic ethics elevated wisdom to be one of the cardinal virtues.^[21] Wisdom and stupidity are not ethically indifferent, as the neo-Protestant ethics of conscience^[22] wanted us to believe. In the fullness of the concrete situation and in the possibilities it offers, the wise person discerns the impassable limits that are imposed on every action by the abiding laws of human communal life. In this discernment the wise person acts well and the good person acts wisely.

[21.] In Aristotle as in Thomas Aquinas, wisdom (φρόνησις; Latin: *prudentia* or *sapientia*), as *genitrix virtutum* ["mother of virtue"—JDG], was both the prerequisite and the source of moral attitudes. With prudence, courage, and justice, wisdom belongs to the so-called four cardinal virtues (or principles). See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.5–13; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.2.61; Schilling, *Lehrbuch der Moralthologie*, 1:225–46; Pieper, *Vom Sinn der Tapferkeit*.

[22.] This was the ethical position propagated by cultural Protestantism (see, e.g., Troeltsch, "Grundprobleme der Ethik," in his *Gesammelte Schriften*, 2:626–39); it assesses the moral value of an action on the basis of the motives on which it is based. It differs in this from an "ethics of responsibility" in which responsibility is assumed for an action's "(foreseeable) consequences" (M. Weber, *Political Writings*, 360).

There is clearly no historically significant action that does not trespass ever again against the limits set by those laws.^[23] But it makes a decisive difference whether such trespasses against the established limit are viewed as their abolishment in principle and hence presented as a law of its own kind, or whether one is conscious that such trespassing is perhaps an unavoidable guilt that has its justification only in that law and limit being reinstated and honored as quickly as possible. It is not necessarily hypocrisy when the aim of political action is said to be the establishment of justice and not simply self-preservation. The world *is*, in fact, so ordered that the fundamental honoring of life's basic laws and rights at the same time best serves self-preservation, and that these laws tolerate a very brief, singular, and, in the individual case, necessary trespass against them. But those laws will sooner or later—and with irresistible force—strike dead those who turn necessity into a principle and as a consequence set up a law of their own alongside them. History's immanent justice rewards and punishes the deed only, but the eternal justice of God tries and judges the hearts.

Some Statements of Faith on God's Action in History

I believe that God can and will let good come out of everything, even the greatest evil. For that to happen, God needs human beings who let everything work out for the best. I believe that in every moment of distress God will give us as much strength to resist as we need. But it is not given to us in advance, lest we rely on ourselves and not on God alone. In such faith all fear of the future should be overcome. I believe that even our mistakes and shortcomings are not in vain and that it is no more difficult for God to deal with them than with our supposedly good deeds. I believe that God is no timeless fate but waits for and responds to sincere prayer and responsible actions.

Trust

Few have been spared the experience of being betrayed. The figure of Judas, once so incomprehensible, is hardly strange to us. The air in which we live is so poisoned with mistrust that we almost die from it. But where we broke through the layer of mistrust, we were allowed to experience a trust hitherto utterly undreamed of. There, where we trust, we have learned to

[23.] See *DBWE* 6:272–75.

place our lives in the hands of others; contrary to all the ambiguities in which our acts and lives must exist, we have learned to trust without reserve. We now know that one can truly live and work only in such trust, which is always a venture but one gladly affirmed. We know that to sow and to nourish mistrust is one of the most reprehensible things and that, instead, trust is to be strengthened and advanced wherever possible. For us trust will be one of the greatest, rarest, and most cheering gifts bestowed by the life we humans live in common, and yet it always emerges only against the dark background of a necessary mistrust. We have learned to commit our lives on no account into the hands of the mean but without reserve into the hands of the trustworthy.

The Sense of Quality

When we lack the courage once again to establish a genuine sense of boundaries between human beings and personally to fight for them, we perish in an anarchy of human values. The impudence that has its being in the contempt for all such boundaries is just as much a mark of the rabble as the inward uncertainty, haggling, and courting the favor of the insolent; making common cause with rabble is the way toward rendering oneself rabble.^[24] When one no longer knows what one owes oneself and others, where the sense for human quality^[25] and the strength to respect boundaries cease to exist, chaos is at the door. When for the sake of material comfort one tolerates impudence, one has already surrendered, there the floods of chaos have been permitted to burst the dam at the place where it was to be defended, and one becomes guilty of all that follows. In other times it may have been the task of Christianity to testify to the equality of all human beings; today it is Christianity in particular that should passionately defend the respect for human boundaries and human qualities. The misinterpretation that it is a matter of self-interest, or the cheap allegation that it is an antisocial attitude, must be resolutely faced. They are the perennial reproaches of the rabble against order. Whoever becomes soft and unsure here does not understand what is at issue, and presumably those reproaches may well apply to him. We are in the midst of the process that levels every rank of society. But we are also at the hour of a new sense of nobility being

[24.] In relation to the key concepts of this section: "rabble," "nobility," "order," "above and below," see *DBWE* 7:26–31. Regarding "above and below," see also *DBWE* 6:372–73, 380, and *DBWE* 16, 2/10, pp. 503–5.

[25.] On "quality," see *DBWE* 7:86–70, and in this volume, 3/145, p. 388.

33 born that binds together a circle of human beings drawn from all existing social classes.^[26] Nobility arises from and exists by sacrifice, courage, and a clear sense of what one owes oneself and others, by the self-evident expectation of the respect one is due, and by an equally self-evident observance of the same respect for those above and those below. At issue all along the line is the rediscovery of experiences of quality that have been buried under so much rubble, of an order based on quality. Quality is the strongest foe of any form of bringing everything to the level of the masses. Socially this means abandoning the pursuit of position, breaking with the star cult, an opening out upward and downward particularly in connection with the choice of one's friends, delight in private life,^[27] and courage for public life. Culturally the experience of quality signals a return from the newspaper and radio to the book,^[28] from haste to leisure and stillness, from distraction to composure, from the sensational to reflection, from the idol of virtuosity to art, from snobbery to modesty, from extravagance to moderation. Quantities compete for space; qualities complement one another.

Sympathy

We have to consider that most people learn wisdom only through personal experiences. This explains, *first*, the astonishing inability of most people to take any kind of preventive action—one always believes that he can evade the danger, until it is too late. *Second*, it explains people's dull sensitivity toward the suffering of others; sympathy grows in proportion to the increasing fear of the threatening proximity of disaster. There is some justification in ethics for such an attitude: one does not want to interfere with fate; inner calling and the power to act are given only when things have become serious. No one is responsible for all of the world's injustice and suffering, nor does one want to establish oneself as the judge of the world. And there is some justification also in psychology: the lack of imagination, sensitivity, and inner alertness is balanced by strong composure, unperturbed energy for work, and great capacity for suffering. From a Christian perspective, none

[26.] Cf. *DBWE* 7:50–51: "Then, around the quiet sanctuary of the highest values a new nobility will form in our time. Neither birth nor success will be the foundation of this nobility, but humility, faith, and sacrifice." For the phrase "new nobility," see *DBWE* 7:50, ed. note 38. See also *Zettelnotizen*, 107, and Tegel note 15 (*NL*, A 86): "It does not depend so much on *what* someone does as on *how* someone does it or, actually, it depends only on *who* it is who does something."

[27.] See 1/25, p. 99, for its assessment of Adalbert Stifter.

[28.] See 3/145 ("Thoughts on the Day of Baptism"), p. 386.

of these justifications can blind us to the fact that what is decisively lacking here is a greatness of heart. Christ withdrew from suffering until his hour had come; then he walked toward it in freedom, took hold, and overcame it. Christ, so the Scripture tells us, experienced in his own body the whole suffering of all humanity as his own—an incomprehensibly lofty thought!—taking it upon himself in freedom. Certainly, we are not Christ, nor are we called to redeem the world through our own deed and our own suffering;^[29] we are not to burden ourselves with impossible things and torture ourselves with not being able to bear them. We are not lords but instruments in the hands of the Lord of history; we can truly share only in a limited measure in the suffering of others. We are not Christ, but if we want to be Christians it means that we are to take part in Christ's greatness of heart, in the responsible action that in freedom lays hold of the hour and faces the danger, and in the true sympathy that springs forth not from fear but from Christ's freeing and redeeming love for all who suffer. Inactive waiting and dully looking on are not Christian responses. Christians are called to action and sympathy not through their own firsthand experiences but by the immediate experience of their brothers,^[30] for whose sake Christ suffered.

On Suffering

It is infinitely easier to suffer in obedience to a human command than in the freedom of one's very own responsible action. It is infinitely easier to suffer in community with others than in solitude. It is infinitely easier to suffer publicly and with honor than in the shadow and in dishonor. It is infinitely easier to suffer through putting one's bodily life at stake than

[29.] See Martin Luther's letter of June 30, 1530, to Spalatin (LW49:348): "We are to be men and not God. That is the pure truth; we can't deny it."

[30.] In the context of the first deportation of Jews from Berlin (October 18, 1941), see the reports composed by F. J. Perels and Bonhoeffer (DBWE 16, 1/133, pp. 225–29). Hans von Dohnanyi made these available to Colonel Oster and General Beck "in the hope that the military would either agree to intervene or accelerate its preparations for revolt" (DB-ER, 746). Cf. also Bethge, "Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Jews," 72–77; C.-R. Müller, *Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Kampf*, 303–20; Schreiber, *Friedrich Justus Perels*, 165–73; W. Meyer, *Unternehmung Sieben*, 7–11. In the church's confession of guilt in the chapter titled "Guilt, Justification, Renewal" in *Ethics*, Bonhoeffer referred to the Jews "for the first time as 'brothers'" (Bethge, "Nichts scheint mehr in Ordnung," 36). The passage from *Ethics* reads: the church "has become guilty of the lives of the weakest and most defenseless brothers and sisters of Jesus Christ" (DBWE 6:139). Regarding the development of that sentence, see DBWE 6:139, ed. note 25. See also Feil, "Freundschaft—ein Thema der Theologie?" 118–19.

to suffer through the spirit. Christ suffered in freedom, in solitude, in the shadow, and in dishonor, in body and in spirit. Since then, many Christians have suffered with him.

Present and Future

To this day, it seemed to us that developing a plan for our professional and personal life was one of the inalienable rights belonging to human life.^[31] That has come to an end. Through the weight of circumstances, we have been put into the situation where we must forgo "worrying about tomorrow."^[32] But there is a crucial difference as to whether this results from the free response of faith, as the Sermon on the Mount states, or is coerced subservience to the demands of the present moment. For most people the enforced renunciation of planning for the future means that they have succumbed to living only for the moment at hand, irresponsibly, frivolously, or resignedly; some still dream longingly of a more beautiful future and try thereby to forget the present. For us both of these courses are equally impossible. What remains for us is only the very narrow path, sometimes barely discernible, of taking each day as if it were the last and yet living it faithfully and responsibly as if there were yet to be a great future. "Houses and fields and vineyards shall again be bought in this land,"^[33] Jeremiah is told to proclaim—in paradoxical contradiction to his prophecies of woe—just before the destruction of the holy city; in light of the utter deprivation of any future, those words were a divine sign and a pledge of a great, new future. To think and to act with an eye on the coming generation and to be ready to move on without fear and worry—that is the course that has, in practice, been forced upon us. To hold it courageously is not easy but necessary.

Optimism

It is more sensible to be pessimistic; disappointments are left behind, and one can face people unembarrassed. Hence, the clever frown upon optimism. In its essence optimism is not a way of looking at the present situation but a power of life, a power of hope when others resign, a power to hold our heads high when all seems to have come to naught, a power to toler-

[31.] See also 2/114, p. 301; 2/115, pp. 305–6; and 3/145, p. 387.

[32.] Matt. 6:34.

[33.] Jer. 32:15.

ate setbacks, a power that never abandons the future to the opponent but lays claim to it. Certainly, there is a stupid, cowardly optimism that must be frowned upon. But no one ought to despise optimism as the will for the future, however many times it is mistaken. It is the health of life that the ill dare not infect. There are people who think it frivolous and Christians who think it impious to hope for a better future on earth and to prepare for it. They believe in chaos, disorder, and catastrophe, perceiving it in what is happening now. They withdraw in resignation or pious flight from the world,^[34] from the responsibility for ongoing life, for building anew, for the coming generations. It may be that the day of judgment will dawn tomorrow; only then and no earlier will we readily lay down our work for a better future.

Peril and Death

In recent years we have become increasingly familiar with the thought of death.^[35] We ourselves are surprised by the composure with which we accept the news of the death of our contemporaries. We can no longer hate Death so much; we have discovered something of kindness in his features and are almost reconciled to him. Deep down we seem to feel that we are his already and that each new day is a miracle. It would not be correct to say that we die gladly—even though no one is unacquainted with that weariness, which ought not to be allowed to arise under any circumstances. We are too inquisitive for that, or, to put it more seriously, we would like to see something more of our scattered life's meaning. But we do not make of Death a hero either; life is too great and too dear for us to do so. Still more do we refuse to look for the meaning of life in danger; we are not desperate enough to do so and know too much of the treasures of life. We also know too well the fear for life and all the other destructive effects of unrelenting imperilment of life. We still love life, but I believe that Death can no longer surprise us. After what we have experienced in the war, we hardly dare acknowledge our wish that Death will find us completely engaged in the fullness of life, rather than by accident, suddenly, away from what really matters. It is not external circumstances but we ourselves who shall make of our death what it can be, a death consented to freely and voluntarily.^[36]

[34.] See the discussion of the "otherworldly" in *DBWE* 12, pp. 285–87.

[35.] On the topic of "death," one that preoccupied Bonhoeffer from his youth, see *DB-ER*, 38–39, 661–62; *DBW* 11:373–74; and *DBW* 15:271.

[36.] See 4/191 ("Stations on the Way to Freedom"); on the relation of freedom and death, see *DBWE* 6:196–203.

38

Are We Still of Any Use?

We have been silent witnesses of evil deeds. We have become cunning and learned the arts of obfuscation and equivocal speech. Experience has rendered us suspicious of human beings, and often we have failed to speak to them a true and open word. Unbearable conflicts have worn us down or even made us cynical. Are we still of any use? We will not need geniuses, cynics, people who have contempt for others, or cunning tacticians, but simple, uncomplicated, and honest human beings. Will our inner strength to resist what has been forced on us have remained strong enough, and our honesty with ourselves blunt enough, to find our way back to simplicity and honesty?

The View from Below^[37]

It remains an experience of incomparable value that we have for once learned to see the great events of world history from below, from the perspective of the outcasts, the suspects, the maltreated, the powerless, the oppressed and reviled, in short from the perspective of the suffering. If only during this time bitterness and envy have not corroded the heart; that we come to see matters great and small, happiness and misfortune, strength and weakness with new eyes; that our sense for greatness, humanness, justice, and mercy has grown clearer, freer, more incorruptible; that we learn, indeed, that personal suffering is a more useful key, a more fruitful principle than personal happiness for exploring the meaning of the world in contemplation and action. But this perspective from below must not lead us to become advocates for those who are perpetually dissatisfied. Rather, out of a higher satisfaction, which in its essence is grounded beyond what is below and above, we do justice to life in all its dimensions and in this way affirm it.

39

[37.] *NL*, A 65,10; typewritten copy, one page, probable date the end of 1942. This is an incomplete sketch that Bonhoeffer did not include in the final text of "After Ten Years." First published in *CS* 2:441. Beginning with the second edition of the new version of *Letters and Papers from Prison* (1967), it was published as the final section of this essay (*LPP*, 17). On "above and below," see ed. note 24.